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A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE SURFACE
MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
Environmentalists hailed with delight the passage of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act [hereinafter SMCRA]I which set
forth uniform environmental standards for coal surface mining opera-
tions. Prior to its enactment, strip mine regulation was either non-exis-
tent or varied from state to state.2 State officials, anxious to protect
local coal industry, were understandably less inclined than their federal
counterparts to enact sound reclamation laws.' Congress sought to rec-
tify this lack of uniformity without imposing exclusive federal control
over strip mine operations.4
The SMCRA gives states primary regulatory responsibility5 for
surface mining and reclamation standards; however, the federal gov-
ernment, through the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and En-
forcement (OSM), retains authority to ensure state compliance.6 States
wishing to assert jurisdiction over surface mining operations within
their boundaries must submit a proposed program of compliance to the
Secretary of the Interior.7 The Secretary has authority to approve or
disapprove state programs, and if necessary, to promulgate and imple-
ment a federal program for a state.' Most coal mining states have
sought to maintain primary authority. As of March 25, 1981, sixteen
states had either a partially approved or a conditionally approved state
program;9 however, Washington, Georgia, Massachusetts and Michi-
gan will be governed by a federal program. Some states are unique.
Massachusetts, Oregon, Michigan and Rhode Island will be governed
by federal exploratory programs, and Alaska is presently being studied.
1. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979).
2. Rochow, The Far Side of Paradox: State Regulation of the Environmental Effects of
Coal Mining, 81 W. VIR. L. REV. 559 (1978-79).
3. Udall, The Enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 in
Retrospect, 81 W. ViR. L. REv. 553 (1978-79).
4. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) reads: "Surface mining and reclamation standards are essen-
tial in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal pro-
duced in different States will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States to
improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their borders."
5. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) reads: "Because of the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic,
chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations, the primary
governmental responsibility for developing, authorizing, issuing and enforcing regulations
for surface mining and reclamation operations subject to this Act should rest with the
States."
6. 30 U.S.C. § 121 l(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
7. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (Supp. III 1979).
8. 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (Supp. III 1979).
9. Telephone conversation with John Higgins, Denver Office of Surface Mining
(March 25, 1981).
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Section 708 of the Act directs the Secretary to initiate a study "of sur-
face coal mining conditions ... [in Alaska] ... in order to determine
which if any of the provisions. . . should be modified with respect to
surface coal mining operations."' 0
Two federal district court cases in 1980, Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Association Inc. v. Andrus"I [hereinafter cited as Vir-
ginia] and Indiana v. Andrus '2 [hereinafter cited as Indiana], declared
major portions' 3 of the SMCRA unconstitutional. These cases are now
on direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 14 The thrust of
10. 30 U.S.C. § 1298(a) (Supp. III 1979).
11. 483 F.Supp. 425 (W.D. Vir. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 79-1538 (U.S. Sup. Ct.
April 1, 1980).
12. 14 ERC 1769 (S.D. Ind. 1980), appealdocketed, No. 80-231 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Aug. 15,
1980).
13. The provisions held to be unconstitutional are in Title V of the Act. Indiana struck
the "prime farmland" provisions as violative of the commerce clause. These provisions re-
quire the coal operator to submit a permit application which identifies prime farmland. 30
U.S.C. § 1257(b)(16). The operator is required to submit a reclamation plan with the appli-
cation which includes statements concerning the productivity of the land prior to mining.
An analysis of premining average yields under high levels of management must be included.
30 U.S.C. § 1258(a)(2)(C). Before the regulatory authority can issue a mining permit on
prime farmlands, it must be clear that the operator has the technological capability to re-
claim the land to equivalent or higher levels of yield. 30 U.S.C. § 1260(d)(1). Furthermore,
the operator is required to separately remove and replace the A, B, and C soil horizons. 30
U.S.C. § 1265(b)(7). Provisions in 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(20) which refer to postmining agri-
cultural use, and in 30 U.S.C. § 1269(c)(2) which allow the regulatory authority to hold the
operator's bond until soil productivity returns, were also stricken, as were provisions requir-
ing an operator commitment to a particular postmining land use. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257(d),
1260(b)(1) and (2). Certain parts of 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(19) and (20), which refer to regula-
tory approval of a postmining land use plan, were invalidated as well as certain support
activities of the postmining land use plan contained in 30 U.S.C. § 1258(a)(2), (3), (4), (8),
and (10). The court also struck the approximate original contour requirements of 30 U.S.C.
§ 1265(b)(3), the topsoiling provisions which require removal of topsoil as a separate layer
and subsequent protection from erosion until replaced, 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(5), and the pro-
visions which require a planning process for identifying areas unsuitable for strip mining.
30 U.S.C. § 1272(a), (c), (d), and (e)(4) and (5).
Essentially, these same provisions were also found violative of the tenth amendment, as
were 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253(a)(1) and (7), and 1254(a), which provides for a federally enacted
state program.
In Virginia the provisions held to be contrary to the tenth amendment were 30 U.S.C.
§ 1265(d) and (e), the steep slope, original contour requirements, which were also found
unconstitutional under the fifth amendment. Section 1272, which prohibits mining near
public roads, occupied dwellings, public buildings, schools, churches, community or institu-
tional buildings, public parks, and cemeteries were also found unconstitutional under the
fifth amendment. (Indiana also found 30 U.S.C. § 1272 contrary to the fifth amendment).
The court also invalidated provisions which require the operator to demonstrate the techno-
logical capability to restore mined land to equivalent or higher levels of yield, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1260(d)(1), the provision withholding bond until such levels are reached, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1269(c)(2), and the provision which set premining productivity as the standard for
postmining productivity, 30 U.S.C. § 1258(a)(2)(C).
14. 10 ENVT'L. REP. (BNA) 2153; 11 ENVT'L. REP. (BNA) 422.
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the constitutional attack is on Title V,15 which contains the controver-
sial environmental standards. The constitutional arguments are based
on the commerce clause,' 6 the tenth amendment limitation of the com-
merce power, and the fifth amendment taking clause.' 7 The most criti-
cal issue on appeal is the tenth amendment limitation on the commerce
power. If the holdings of Virginia and Indiana are affirmed on that
issue, it would not only affect major provisions of the SMCRA but
could substantially alter the regulatory scheme of federal environmen-
tal legislation. The fifth amendment issue may not have such a poten-
tially broad impact, yet an affirmance would require a congressional re-
evaluation of the Act's reclamation standards. The commerce clause
issue could also have important ramifications if the Indiana analysis is
upheld.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Congress based its power to enact the SMCRA on the commerce
clause.'" In Virginia and Indiana, the plaintiffs contend that Congress
exceeded its commerce power. Although the two courts used a similar
approach, the Virginia court found no commerce clause violation while
the Indiana court reached the opposite conclusion.
The central question is whether or not Congress can regulate coal
production. Early commerce clause analysis suggests that Congress
does not have such authority. In United States v. E. C Knight Co. , ' the
Supreme Court distinguished commerce from manufacturing. Manu-
facturing was defined as the fashioning of raw materials into a change
of form for use, whereas commerce was defined as buying and selling
and the transportation incidental thereto. Manufacturing was consid-
ered a local activity, beyond the reach of the commerce clause; conse-
quently, the power to regulate should be with the state. The distinction
was again recognized in Hammer v. Dagenhart20 where congress at-
tempted to exclude goods produced by child labor from interstate com-
merce: "The grant of power to Congress is to regulate. . . commerce,
and not to give it authority to control the states in their exercise of the
15. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1279 (Supp. Ill 1979).
16. "The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations
and among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17. Other issues addressed by both courts will not be discussed in this Comment. The
selection of issues is based upon their potential impact on constitutional law and federal
legislation.
18. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) and (j) (Supp. III 1979).
19. 156 U.S. 1, 14 (1895).
20. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). It must be noted that the reasoning utilized by the Hammer
Court has been long abandoned. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).
[V/ol. 2
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police power over local trade and manufacture."'" In Carter v. Carter
Coal Co. 22 the court again distinguished production from commerce.
Congress attempted to regulate maximum hours and minimum wages
in coal mines. The Court defined commerce as intercourse for the pur-
poses of trade and said the incidents leading up to and culminating in
the mining of coal do not constitute such intercourse.23 Production was
"a purely local activity"24 beyond the reach of the commerce power.
Modem commerce clause analysis begins with the 1937 case of Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,2 which
marked a significant change from definitional commerce clause analy-
sis. The Supreme Court upheld an order against Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation for interfering with union activities. It was argued
that since the company was engaged in manufacturing, its activities
were beyond the reach of the commerce power. The court rejected the
argument and adopted the close and substantial relationship test: "Al-
though activities may be intrastate in character. . . if they have such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control
is essential. . . Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that
control."26 Competition among industry was also recognized as suffi-
cient justification to invoke the commerce power in United States v.
Darby,2 7 where the Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The Court held that prohibition of the movement of goods in in-
terstate commerce was a valid means to achieve the legitimate end of
eliminating sub-standard labor conditions which were injurious to in-
terstate commerce.28 The court disavowed any control over the legisla-
tive motive or purpose of the regulation. 29 Both Jones & Laughlin and
Darby recognized congressional power to regulate the terms and condi-
tions of intrastate activities which have a relationship to interstate com-
merce.
Even if the specific intrastate activity sought to be regulated by
Congress has an insignificant impact on interstate commerce, it can
still be within the reach of the commerce clause. In Wickard v. Fil-
burn3 the court upheld marketing quotas of wheat applied to an indi-
vidual farmer. There, a farmer's wheat production exceeded the
21. 247 U.S. at 273.
22. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
23. Id. at 303.
24. Id. at 304.
25. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
26. Id. at 37.
27. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
28. Id. at 121.
29. Id. at 115.
30. 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
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marketing quota established for his farm. The farmer argued that the
excess was to be consumed on the farm, but the Court held that al-
though the farmer's own demand for wheat was trivial itself, it was
insufficient to remove him from federal regulation where "his contribu-
tion, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far
from trivial."31 The Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wirtz32 also
touched on "trivial impacts": "a trivial impact on commerce [is not] an
excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities. ' 33 It
should be noted that the Supreme Court in Wickard did not unilater-
ally suggest that Congress can regulate trivial intrastate activities;
rather, the suggestion was that regulation of individual and insignifi-
cant activities is allowed so long as the regulation bears a substantial
relation to commerce.
The Supreme Court has adhered to the guidelines established
since Jones & Laughlin. The standard of review that has emerged is
that "justices will defer to the legislative choices. . and uphold laws
if there is a rational basis upon which congress could find a relation
between ... regulation and commerce."3 4 Simply stated, Congress
must rationally conclude that the regulation is related to interstate
commerce.
In Virginia the court used the "rational basis" test, imposing upon
itself the Darby limitation as it applied the test; it would not examine
the motive behind the legislation .3  The court found several reasons
for holding that the SMCRA was a rational exercise of congressional
power under the commerce clause. First, "there is no question that
coal moves in interstate commerce and that its production has a sub-
stantial effect on the national economy."36 The enactment of the SM-
CRA was a congressional attempt "to insure that surface mining of this
valuable commodity is accomplished with regard to its impact on inter-
state commerce and the public welfare."37 Second, if reclamation is not
done in an environmentally sound manner, the land will lose produc-
tivity in terms of its ability to support other "important forms of com-
merce." 38 Third, the environmental side effects of substandard
reclamation, "stream pollution, floods, landslides, loss of fish and wild-
life habitats, erosion of other lands, and hydrological imbalances,"
39
31. Id. at 127-128.
32. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
33. Id. at 196, n. 27.
34. NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150 (1978).
35. Virginia, 483 F.Supp. at 430.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 431.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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cumulatively have a substantial impact on interstate commerce.
The Indiana court also cited the "rational basis" test but did not
use the analysis for all of the contested provisions. With respect to the
prime farmland provisions," the court relied heavily on the trivial im-
pacts concept of Maryland v. Wirtz.4 The court concluded that "sur-
face coal mining operations on prime farmland, as distinguishedper se
from any other type of land, have an infinitesimal or trivial impact on
interstate commerce."42 The prime farmland provisions were "directed
at facets of surface coal mining which have no substantial and adverse
affect on interstate commerce. '43 Trivial impacts on interstate com-
merce do not provide justification for assertion of the commerce power,
but the holding of Wickard" suggests that trivial impacts can be regu-
lated as long as there is a substantial relationship between the regula-
tion and commerce.
Indiana did not totally abandon the "rational basis" test. After
finding that the prime farmland provisions were not related to the re-
moval of air and water pollution, the court held that these provisions
were not a means reasonably and plainly adapted to the legitimate end
*of removing any substantial adverse affect on interstate commerce.45
This is a narrow view compared with the findings of Congress: "Many
surface mining operations result in disturbances of surface areas that
burden and adversely affect commerce;"'  "there are a substantial
number of acres throughout major regions of the United States. . . on
which little or no reclamation was conducted, and the impacts from
these unreclaimed lands impose social and economic costs; . . ."I
"surface and underground coal mining operations affect interstate com-
merce."
48
THE TENTH AMENDMENT
The text of the tenth amendment is concise. "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 49
In 1941 the judicial interpretation of the amendment was just as con-
cise: "The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has
40. Supra note 13.
41. Supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
42. Indiana, 14 ERC at 1773.
43. Id. at 1775.
44. Supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
45. Indiana, 14 ERC at 1775.
46. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (Supp. III 1979).
47. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (Supp. III 1979).
48. 30 U.S.C. § 12016) (Supp. 111 1979).
49. U.S. COi.ST. amend. X.
1981]
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not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between
the national and state governments."50 The amendment is no longer a
dormant truism. It has become an active limitation on the commerce
power. The new tenth amendment doctrine developed in National
League of Cities v. Usery5l recognizes that the federal system limits the
congressional commerce power, prohibiting Congress from regulating
the "States as States," since "there are attributes of sovereignty attach-
ing to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress
"52
Both Virginia and Indiana rely heavily on National League to con-
clude that parts53 of the SMCRA are unconstitutional. In National
League, Secretary Usery was defending the 1974 amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act.5 4 The amendments required states to com-
ply with wage and hour guidelines applicable to state employees. The
Supreme Court held the amendments unconstitutional. The critical
point was not that the legislation required states to comply with the
regulations, but rather that Congress imposed wage and hour guide-
lines on the states' relationships with their own employees. From this
critical distinction comes the first arm of the two-part test of National
League.
State-Pivate Analysis
The first arm of the test is easily stated and easily misinterpreted, if
taken out of the factual context of NationalLeague. The test is whether
or not the legislation is directed to the states as states.5 When Virginia
and Indiana invalidated legislation requiring their states to conform to
federal environmental protection standards, the two courts drew a
faulty analogy. National League did not strike the legislation because
it forced state compliance but because its ultimate regulatory effect was
on the "States as States."56 The ultimate regulatory effect of the SM-
CRA, in contrast, is on the coal mine operator. The Virginia court
50. 312 U.S. at 124.
51. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
52. Id. at 845.
53. Supra note 13.
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
55. National League, 426 U.S. at 845.
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating indi-
vidual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of
the Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a
similar exercise of Congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to
the States as States.
56. "The act, speaking directly to the States qua States, requires that they shall pay...
the minimum wage rates currently chosen by Congress." Id. at 847-48.
[Vol. 2
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clearly recognized that "the act ultimately affects the coal mine opera-
tor,"57 but it did not realize the importance of its own statement in the
context of the National League doctrine.58 Failing to recognize this
critical distinction, both courts found that the SMCRA was legislation
directed to the "States as States." This finding is a prerequisite to con-
sideration of the second arm of the two-part test.
Integral Governmental Function Analysis
The second arm of the test addresses the kind or type of regulation
as opposed to the first arm, which addresses the direction or focus of
the legislation. The second test is whether or not the contested regula-
tion will "impermissibly interfere with the integral governmental func-
tions"' 9 of the states. In National League the determination of wages,
hours, and overtime compensation of state employees was found to be
an integral governmental function.60 The court lists several other activ-
ities typically performed by state governments: "fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation." 61
However, the list was mentioned in the context of the states' ability "to
structure employer-employee relationships. ' 62 Nothing in the opinion
justifies the Virginia and Indiana courts' interpretation of National
League that land use control is an integral governmental function. To
the contrary, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion indicates that this
is an unjustified expansion: "I may misinterpret the Court's opinion,
but it seems to me that it adopts a balancing approach, and does not
outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where
the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility
compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 63
Virginia and Indiana justified the interpretation that land use con-
trol was an integral governmental function by referring to various pro-
visions of the SMCRA. The Virginia court pointed to the steep slope
approximate original contour provision as being the most "intrusive
practical aspect of the act," 64 since it requires complete back-filling to
cover the highwall left from a surface cut. In essence, the Virginia
court argued that the state was precluded from deciding whether or not
it would be beneficial to allow the land to remain level after surface
mining operations since "the facts show there is a great need for level
57. Virginia, 483 F.Supp. at 432.
58. Supra note 56.
59. National League, 426 U.S. at 851.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 856.
64. Virginia, 483 F.Supp. at 433.
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land in the seven counties that comprise the coal fields of Virginia."65
Furthermore, the court noted that "if land is restored to its original
contour, its worth reverts to the lower values."66 [RIeturning a steep
slope to original contour. . . is economically infeasible and physically
impossible." 67 The Indiana analysis is essentially the same. However,
the focus is on the prime farmland provisions. These provisions reflect
"a federal land use decision that no higher or better use exists for such
land, 68 and the state is denied "management. . .of (a) traditional
governmental function. . . in the area of land use control and plan-
ning." 69
It seems unlikely that these justifications will stand. First, Justice
Blackmun, casting the deciding vote in National League, explicitly
stated that there is an important federal interest in environmental pro-
tection. Second, NationalLeague gives no indication that land use con-
trol is an integral governmental function. The holding was narrowly
limited to the states' authority to manage employer-employee relation-
ships. Lastly, Congress recognized that postmining uses could be dif-
ferent from premining uses: "Many surface mining operations result in
disturbances of surface areas. . . by destroying or diminishing the util-
ity of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, agricul-
tural, and forestry purposes."7
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Judicial interpretation of the fifth amendment taking clause 7' is
clear, that governmental regulation of private property can constitute a
taking. This concept was recognized in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon72 where the Supreme Court stated that "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking."73 The contested statute in Pennsylvania Coal pro-
hibited underground coal mining in such a way that surface structures
would be damaged by subsidence. The Supreme Court invalidated the
statute, stating that to make "it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect. . . as appropriating or
65. Id. at 434.
66. Id.
67. 1d.
68. Indiana, 14 ERC at 1780.
69. Id. at 1781.
70. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (Supp. 1111979).
71. "[INor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST., amend. V.
72. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
73. Id. at 415.
[Vol. 2
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destroying it."' 74 Virginia and Indiana analogized the'contested statute
in Pennsylvania Coal to the SMCRA. In Virginia the contested provi-
sions of the SMCRA required operators to return steep slopes to their
approximate original contour, and compliance was found to be "eco-
nomically and physically impossible." 75 Indiana found it tecnologi-
cally impossible to return prime farmlands to equivalent or higher
levels of yield.76 Both courts also invalidated parts77 of section 522
which prohibits surface mining near occupied dwellings, public roads,
buildings, schools, churches, community or institutional buildings,
parks, and cemeteries.7 The courts' rationale recognized that since
coal can be owned as a mineral interest, and cannot be removed be-
cause of overly restrictive regulations, the mineral interest is destroyed
and a taking results. This analysis of the taking clause is based on the
"diminution of value" theory which measures or balances the taking
issue primarily in terms of financial loss. "When [diminution of value]
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation." '79
Recent cases place less emphasis on diminution of value. In Gold-
blatt Y. Hempstead80 the Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance
which effectively prohibited continued operation of a sand and gravel
quarry. The court not only considered loss to the owner but also evalu-
ated the adverse nature of the quarry and the availability of less drastic
regulations. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City8 I the
property owner sought permission from the New York Landmark Pres-
ervation Commission to build a multi-story office building above
Grand Central Station. The Commission refused to allow construc-
tion. The Supreme Court upheld the refusal, finding that landmark
preservation ordinances were akin to zoning ordinances which promote
the general public welfare.82 Both of these modem cases place empha-
sis on the public purpose being served by the contested regulation.
The Supreme Court has been unable to develop any set formula
which is applicable to the taking clause analysis.8 3 Each case will be
decided on its individual facts. 4 Consequently, it is difficult to predict
the result of a taking issue on appeal. However, there are reasons to
74. Id. at 414.
75. Virginia, 483 F.Supp. at 441.
76. Indiana, 14 ERC at 1783.
77. Supra note 13.
78. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (Supp. 111 1979).
79. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
80. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
81. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
82. Id. at 133.
83. Id. at 124.
84. Id.
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suggest that the Virginia and Indiana analysis will not stand. First, the
two courts rely heavily on the diminution-of-value theory while recent
decisions have placed more emphasis on the public welfare. Second,
Congressional findings indicate that reclamation technology has devel-
oped to the point where adherence to the standards of the SMCRA is
both necessary and appropriate.85
CONCLUSION
Both cases were argued before the Supreme Court on February 23,
1981.86 At the time of this writing, an opinion had not been issued, but
the outcome will likely support the SMCRA as a valid exercise of Con-
gressional power. The Indiana commerce clause analysis should be re-
versed because intrastate activities are clearly within the scope of the
commerce power as long as Congress finds a rational relationship be-
tween the regulated activity and interstate commerce. Extensive Con-
gressional findings justify the existence of this relationship. 7 Even
trivial impacts which cumulatively affect commerce are reachable. The
tenth amendment holdings of Virginia and Indiana are clearly errone-
ous. National League was misinterpreted and unjustifiably extended.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion strongly suggests a reversal.
The fifth amendment holdings are~also suspect. The courts rely on a
single case, rejecting recent decisions which emphasize the public pur-
pose being served by the legislation. Policy reasons also support the
validity of the SMCRA. Regulation of the environment has increas-
ingly been viewed as a federal responsibility, since environmental ef-
fects do not stop at state boundaries. There is a strong need for
uniformity and cooperation among the states. The SMCRA was en-
acted to achieve uniform surface mining and reclamation standards
without which "competition in interstate commerce among sellers of
coal produced in different States will. . be used to undermine the
ability of the several States to improve and maintain adequate stan-
dards on coal mining operations within their borders."88
-Thomas P. Meissner
85. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(e) (Supp. 111 1979).
86. 49 U.S. LAW WEEK (BNA) 3639 (1981).
87. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(e), (g), (j) (Supp. 11 1979).
88. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (Supp. III 1979).
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